If one files a case for declaration of nullity of marriage, alleges only that the other spouse is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, but eventually the court in a judgment that becomes final dismisses the case with prejudice, can one still file another case for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that the marriage is bigamous? This question was answered by the case of Mallion vs Alcantara (GR 141528, Oct 31, 2006) in the negative.
On the other hand, is a court in a declaration of nullity case justified in allowing an amendment to the complaint to include the allegation that the marriage is void being bigamous in order to conform to the evidence presented, when the original complaint only alleged psychological incapacity as a ground? If the complaint is not amended to conform to evidence presented (concerning bigamy), the court nevertheless declared the marriage void due to its bigamous nature, will such judgment hold if the appealing party did not allege this defect in his/her appeal? Both questions were answered by the Supreme Court in Lam vs Chua (G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004).
Mallion vs Alcantara (GR 141528, Oct 31, 2006)
In 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the San Pablo City RTC (Civil Case 4341-95) alleging that his wife was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. That case was dismissed “upon the finding that petitioner “failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.” In 1999, Oscar filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis that the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license.
The issue was framed by the Supreme Court as follows:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The Supreme Court answered the issue in the negative, reasoning that:
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.”
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… Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order onthemerits; and (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[Luzon Development Bank v. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 533]
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. [Sangalang v. Caparas, G.R. No. L-49749, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 53.]
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.[RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Section 2.]In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause – the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.[Carlet v. CA, G.R. No. 114275, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 97.]
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Lam vs Chua (G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004)
In this case, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by the wife (Adriana Chua, respondent) against the husband (Jose Lam, petitioner) alleging that their marriage was void due to psychological incapacity of the husband (under Article 36 of the Family Code). After the wife’s presentation of evidence on psychological incapacity (without presentation of evidence on support), her motion to reopen the case was granted, whereupon she presented evidence on support and that her marriage to Jose was bigamous and void since Jose was previously married twice. During this hearing, the wife was allowed to testify in Court to prove support and the wife’s counsel was allowed by the Court to insert in the petition ‘the handwritten phrase “And for respondent to support the child of petitioner in an amount this Honorable Court may deem just and reasonable”’; there was no insertion of any phrase regarding the bigamous marriages of the husband in the petition, and the husband was not notified of any amendments to the petition.
The Supreme Court would also have nullified the trial court’s decision declaring the marriage void due to bigamy because the petition was not amended nor was the respondent notified of any amendments since there ‘nothing on record to show that petitioner Jose was notified of the substantial changes in the petition’. However, the Supreme Court held that since Jose did not raise this ground in assailing the trial court’s decision, Jose ‘estopped from questioning the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Adriana and therefore, the Court will not undo the judgment of the Pasay RTC declaring the marriage of Adriana and Jose null and void for being bigamous. It is an axiomatic rule that while a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, this, however, admits of an exception where estoppel has supervened.[20][TGL Sales Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 35 (2001)]’
Arguably, the premise of the Lam vs Chua (2004) case is that substantial changes in the petition through the introduction of evidence without objection of the other party is allowed even in declaration of nullity cases, provided the other party is notified of these substantial changes. Even if the other party has not filed an answer, the other party is entitled to notification since there is no default in declaration of nullity and legal separation cases: see for instance, the following portion of the Supreme Court’s Decision:
A party who has been declared in default is entitled to service of substantially amended or supplemental pleadings.[16][quoting s 9 Rule 13 Rules of Court] Considering that in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage or annulment of marriage, there can be no default pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court[17][quoting s 6 Rule 18 Rules of Court] in relation to Article 48 of the Family Code,[18][quoting Article 48 Family Code] it is with more reason that petitioner should likewise be entitled to notice of all proceedings.
By: Atty. Alex Andrew P. Icao
Philippine Family Law perspectives 